Evaluating the impact of land tenure and titling on access to credit in Uganda: by Petracco, Carly K. & Pender, John
 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 00853 
March 2009 
Evaluating the Impact of Land Tenure and Titling on  
Access to Credit in Uganda 
Carly K. Petracco  
John Pender 
Environment and Production Technology Division INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 
agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and 
international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTNERS 
IFPRI’s research, capacity strengthening, and communications work is made possible by its financial 
contributors and partners. IFPRI receives its principal funding from governments, private foundations, 
and international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). IFPRI gratefully acknowledges the generous unrestricted 
funding from Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 




Carly K. Petracco, American University 
 
John Pender, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Senior Research Fellow, Environment Production Technology Division  
Notices 
1 Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General’s Office of IFPRI 
were merged into one IFPRI–wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the 
prior publication of 688 discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI’s 
website at www.ifpri.org/pubs/otherpubs.htm#dp. 
2 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and have been peer reviewed by at 
least two reviewers—internal and/or external. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical 
comment. 
Copyright 2009 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this material may be reproduced for 
personal and not-for-profit use without the express written permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce the 
material contained herein for profit or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission, contact the 




Abstract  v 
1.  Introduction  1 
2.  Research Question  2 
3.  Literature Review  4 
4.  Uganda’s Land Tenure History  6 
5.  Survey Data  8 
6.  Method of Analysis  10 
7.  Descriptive Results  15 
8.  Conclusion  26 




List of Tables 
1.   Companions used in the analysis  2 
2.   Descriptive statistics of variables  12 
3.   Tenure by region in number of households  15 
4.   Access to credit, formal and informal by region in number of households  16 
4b. Comparison of credit access by region  16 
5.   Access to credit, formal and informal, by tenure in number of households  17 
6.   Access to credit, formal and informal, by certificate of title/ownership in number of households  18 
7.   Probit results  19 
8.   Balancing test results (pstest)  20 
9   Results for access to credit  24 
10  Results for access to informal credit  24 
11  Results for access to formal credit  25 
 
List of Figures 






The theorized impact of land tenure and titling on access to credit has produced mixed results in the 
empirical literature. Land tenure and titling is hypothesized to increase access to credit because of the 
enhanced land security provided and the newfound ability to use land as collateral. Using land as 
collateral and obtaining access to credit are paramount concerns in Uganda and in all of Africa, as greater 
emphasis is placed on the need to modernize the agricultural system. This paper uses a new approach in 
evaluating whether land tenure and titling have an impact on access to credit for rural households in 
Uganda. The new approach includes comparisons across four categories: (1) households who have 
customary land with versus without a customary certificate, (2) households who have freehold land with 
versus without a title, (3) households with a title or certificate having freehold versus customary tenure, 
and (4) households without a title or certificate having freehold versus customary tenure. Each 
comparison is then evaluated for the impact on access to any form of credit, formal credit, and informal 
credit. This analysis allows for an in-depth look into which element, tenure or title, is impacting access to 
credit and to which type of credit, formal or informal. To conduct this analysis, matching techniques are 
used, including propensity score matching and the Abadie and Imbens matching method. These two 
methods contain both strengths and weaknesses that allow the results to support to one another. The only 
significant finding of the matching was a positive impact on access to credit of freehold without title over 
customary without certificate. Results imply that tenure, not title, impacts credit access for rural 
households in Uganda. 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Theory has given rise to the idea that transforming the “dead capital” of the poor into usable capital will 
provide an engine for economic growth in developing nations (De Soto 2000). The basis of the theory is 
that communal land institutions are inefficient, but titling land will increase security of ownership, and 
consequently owners will then optimize their use of the land. The response has been an explosion of land 
titling reforms throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Some countries that have initiated or are 
currently developing titling programs include Peru, Vietnam, Cambodia, Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Ghana, South Africa, Botswana, Turkey, and the Philippines.  
The effects of tenure and titling, including increased access to credit, are hypothesized to be 
multiple and extensive for developing countries. Freehold tenure allows the owner to use the land as seen 
fit—for sale, lease, or mortgage—while customary tenure is subject to the traditions and customs of the 
community. Theory suggests that land titling provides greater land security, meaning ownership is 
protected and unchallenged. This enables the owner to use the land as collateral, since borrowers can 
prove free-and-clear ownership and lenders are easily able to recuperate the land in the case of default. 
These advantages of freehold tenure and formal title are hypothesized to lead to numerous advantages that 
contribute to increased economic development, including increased access to and use of formal credit 
secured by land mortgages (De Soto 2000). This paper tests whether this hypothesis is supported by 
evidence from rural Uganda. 
The concern about land tenure and titling may seem a tired subject that has been over examined. 
Indeed, many studies have scrutinized the impacts of land titling and tenure on credit access, land 
investment, agricultural productivity, and other issues in Africa and other developing regions (e.g., Feder 
et al. 1988; Barrows and Roth 1990; Place and Hazell 1993; Roth et al. 1994; Besley 1995; Gavian and 
Fafchamps 1996; Platteau 1996; Hayes et al. 1997; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Pender and Kerr 1999; 
Otsuka and Place 2001; Deininger 2003). Nevertheless, the issue is still very topical, and the evidence on 
the impacts of tenure and title on credit access is not entirely clear, and in most cases a bit dated. Studies 
on this issue in Uganda, which has undergone major changes in land tenure policies in the past decade, 
are quite limited. Although a decade has passed since the Ugandan Land Act of 1998 was enacted, the 
issues of land tenure and rights remain at the forefront of Ugandans’ thoughts and policy debates. 
Newspapers report incidences of violence against tenants, returning IDPs (internally displaced people), 
and others involved in unsolved land disputes (Kalibbala 2008; Aciro 2008). Additionally, the Uganda 
parliament is currently considering an amendment to the Land Act aimed at resolving the many disputes 
that have arisen since 1998 and providing greater security to land occupants (Parliament of Uganda 2008). 
Lack of access to rural credit is a major constraint to achieving the goals of the Ugandan 
government’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan and its Plan for Modernization of Agriculture. 
Policymakers need to know whether the land tenure reforms pursued under the 1998 Land Act are 
contributing to increased credit access, or could contribute to a greater extent, in order to build on the 
successes that are occurring. Alternatively, they need to know whether the Land Act should be revised to 
improve its effectiveness. It is therefore necessary that Ugandans continue to reassess the impact of tenure 
and title on their access to credit and other aspects of their lives. Utilizing household survey data from 
Uganda, this paper will seek to determine if land title and/or tenure rights status affect access to credit 





2.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does tenure status or title impact rural households’ access to credit, formal and informal, in Uganda? 
Comparison will occur within and between freehold and customary households. The focus on customary 
and freehold tenure is out of a need to understand the full impact of the Land Act of 1998. Currently, the 
vast majority of land in the country, and 69 percent of the parcels in this data set, are of customary tenure. 
In the hope of modernization, the Land Act was designed to facilitate the transition of Uganda from 
customary to freehold landownership (Baland et al. 2007; Coldham 2000). The proposed benefits 
included more efficient land markets and land use, with greater access to credit and investment (Platteau 
1996). To do this the Land Act provided a path to freehold tenure with title, as well as provided 
customary landowners an intermediate option to obtain a certificate of customary ownership. This 
certificate serves as proof of customary ownership, but does not free the owner from the customary laws 
and restrictions that govern the land, including in many cases restrictions on the ability of the owner to 
sell or mortgage their land. 
The question of impact will be applied to four comparisons of tenure and title status (see Table 1). 
The comparisons made will be between (1) households who have customary land with versus without a 
customary certificate (B-D in Table 1), (2) households who have freehold land with versus without a title 
(A-C in Table 1), (3) households with a title or certificate having freehold versus customary tenure (A-B), 
and (4) households without a title or certificate having freehold versus customary tenure (C-D). These 
multiple comparisons are needed to understand whether the rights conferred upon a specific tenure 
status—such as freehold tenure with unrestricted rights versus customary tenure subject to the communal 
norms and traditions—lead to greater access to credit, or whether the proof of tenure status provided by a 
title or certificate increases access to credit. Although such comparisons are essential to distinguish the 
effects of tenure per se from those of titling, we have not seen this type of analysis in the previous 
literature.  
Table  1. Companions used in the analysis 
   Rights status  Impact of rights status 
Title/Certificate   Freehold  Customary   
Yes A  B  A-B 
No C  D  C-D 
Impact of title or certificate   A-C  B-D    
Source: Compiled by authors. 
The first comparison will be within customary households, between those with and without a 
customary certificate. This disaggregation is looking for whether certificates affect access to credit, which 
would identify any credit-related incentives. The second analysis is of freehold tenure households, 
between those with and without a title. The objective is to analyze whether a title impacts access to credit 
for freehold households and if there is a need for those with freehold to incur the cost of obtaining a 
titling. The third comparison is between freehold with title and customary with certificate. This 
comparison is important because if no difference exists, then it is possibly attributable to possession of 
any title/certificate and not the tenure status of the household, leaving little incentive for customary with 
certificate to shift to freehold with title. The final comparison is between freehold without title and 
customary without certificate. This level of analysis runs counter to the previous grouping, assessing 
whether differences in credit access exist between freehold and customary tenure, regardless of 
documentation. If differences exist in credit access, then it could be attributed to the tenure status and not  
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ownership of title/certificate. For each of the four comparisons, the analysis will investigate differences in 
access to any form of credit, as well as differences in access to formal or informal credit.1 
                                                      
1 Formal credit is comprised of credit from banks and microfinance institutions, while the informal credit consists of credit 
from friends, relatives, employers, landlords, local money lenders, shopkeepers or village-level associations. These classifications 
are based on the survey; however, microfinance institutions were categorized in the survey as “semiformal credit.” The number 
of observations in the formal and semiformal categories was too small to test for significance of impacts on each separately; thus, 
the formal and semiformal categories were combined.   
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3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on land tenure and titling is extensive and growing as researchers seek definitive 
understanding of the impact of these on the poor of developing countries. Included in this exhaustive 
amount of research are the theories of how land tenure impacts credit. The effect occurs on three levels: 
demand, supply, and transactionary (Feder et al. 1988; Carter and Olinto 2003; Place and Hazell 1993; 
Besley 1995; Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994; Hayes et al. 1997; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Pender and 
Kerr 1999). Land tenure security may increase demand for credit: increased land security may result in 
the desire of families to invest more in their land, resulting in a greater demand for capital. The effect on 
the credit supply is an increase in the willingness of lenders to provide credit if borrowers have the ability 
to use secured land as collateral. With secure and titled land as collateral for credit, creditors can lawfully 
repossess land if necessary in the event of a default. In addition, the threat of repossessing collateral acts 
as an incentive to the borrower to repay the loan on time. The final theorized effect of secure and titled 
land tenure is through its effects on land transactions: secure land tenure may facilitate the emergence of 
efficient land markets, where land is employed for its best use. Transactions will become easier as people 
have official documentation of landownership, and potential buyers no longer have to worry about 
competing claims.  
One of the first publications to develop this theory and present evidence in favor of the 
connection between title and credit was Feder et al. (1988). Using data from Thailand, evidence was 
presented in support of the hypothesis that if title provides land security, then land could be more easily 
transferred, along with providing unquestionable ownership. Feder et al. showed that the combination of 
these two facts results in land becoming usable as collateral; thus, the Thai farmers who had land titles 
had greater access to credit, used more credit, and at lower interest rates, with the outcome of increased 
productivity. Other studies have supported these conclusions; there was evidence in Gambia that 
increased individual rights lead to greater credit access and investment, resulting in higher productivity 
(Hayes et al. 1997). Studies of multiple African countries suggest that although access to credit is 
increased for those with title, this access does not increase the overall supply of credit but rather a 
redirecting of the credit (Barrows and Roth 1990). These results may provide the extra incentive needed 
for households to move towards titling. 
However, the data have not been conclusive about the connection between titling and access to 
credit. Data from Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda showed no significant relationship between tenure rights 
and investment in the land (Place and Hazell 1993). Additionally, a comparative study of Uganda’s 
neighbors Tanzania and Kenya found similar results. Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) found that neither of 
the countries’ tenure systems increased access to land-secured loans, increased security through titling, or 
increased investment as a result. A glimpse of Uganda before the Land Act is provided by a study of an 
early, pilot land registration scheme in Rujumbura. The study found little use of credit in general and no 
link to registered/titled land. In fact, most credit was used by untitled landholders from informal sources 
for off-farm needs (Roth et al. 1994). These results may discourage hopeful proponents of titling, or they 
may suggest that different cultures use titling in different ways. 
The lack of significant impact may not stem from the failure of the titling system, but rather from 
earlier adaptations by the society. A lack of formal titling describes much of Africa’s past and present; as 
a result, borrowers and lenders were forced to make do with the circumstances at hand. If this is true, then 
even those who do obtain title may not see an impact on their access to credit, because lenders have 
already developed mechanisms for screening borrowers. These adaptations can be understood as 
adjustments by customary, indigenous practices to the existing situation, which lacked title (Pinckney and 
Kimuyu 1994; Goldstein and Udry 2005). This may include village money-lenders’ relying on personal 
relationships over assets, as seen in southern India (Pender and Kerr 1999). If communities have never 
had to back their loans with land title, coupled with their considering the great importance of land as a 
source of survival, then the impact of titling may be limited in this setting.  
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For all the emphasis on the impact of titles on credit and investment, it could possibly be the other 
way around. Depending on the society, land tenure may not affect investment, but investment may affect 
land tenure (Aluma et al. 1993; Besley 1995; Sjaastad and Bromley1997; Otsuka and Place 2001; 
Deininger and Jin 2006). The logic is that people invest in the land as a form of staking claim and 
increasing their perceived ownership. A frequent method is the planting of trees, because trees require 
time to grow fully. Following this train of thought, evidence from Ghana shows that the continuation of 
usufruct rights requires that farmers fallow the land for less time and continue to farm (Goldstein and 
Udry 2005). The result of insecure land rights is constant cultivation and minimal fallowing of the land. 
In a situation such as this, demand for titling may be limited because people are accustomed to acquiring 
secure ownership through physical investment in the land. Conversely, this may be the same society that 
needs titling the most so that landowners can utilize their land for the best use, whether under cultivation 
or left to fallow.  
Nevertheless, it is the potential use of credit that makes access to it crucial for households in 
Uganda. Data from two districts in Uganda, Kumi and Rakai, found that limited access to credit hindered 
diversification of the household into nonfarm activities (Smith et al. 2001). Data from the African country 
Mali also supported this hypothesis, finding that a lack of capital was a significant reason for poor 
households not to diversify their income sources (Abdulai and CroleRees 2001). The poor households are 
unable to escape the trap of subsistence farming because of their limited access to credit. Unfortunately, 
access is further restricted in rural portions of Africa that remain underserved by lenders, exacerbating the 
problem (Goldstein and Udry 2005; Diagne 1999). 
Credit not only affects Ugandan households’ ability to transition away from agriculture, but also 
their agricultural activities. Nkonya et al. (2004) found that availability of informal credit was related to 
greater cereal production and increased labor intensity in crop production in Uganda. More recently, in a 
survey of Ugandans’ desire to acquire full ownership rights of any type of land that they have only user 
rights over, respondents expressed great willingness through the large amount of money they were willing 
to pay to obtain full ownership rights (Deininger and Ali 2007). The willingness of so many Ugandans to 
pay implied that great economic benefits could be realized from legally recognized landownership. The 
existing restrictions on credit access caused by the lack of land tenure and title feed into the inability of 
poor households in Africa to break away from the subsistence approach and move into commercial 
farming or nonfarm enterprises.  
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4.  UGANDA’S LAND TENURE HISTORY 
Uganda is a nation with a contentious land tenure past and an uncertain future. Original land rights were 
governed by the customary laws and norms of the society using the land, and many of these laws continue 
today. The main form of acquisition of customary land is through inheritance, usually father to son. The 
inheritance is frequently not ownership of the land, but only usufruct, as is the status of most customary 
land (Deininger and Castagnini 2006). No title is passed on with the land, and very little customary land 
was ever titled before the Land Act of 1998 (Aluma et al. 1993). In fact, customary land tenure was never 
recognized under the law until the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. Before then, customary landowners were 
seen as only tenants on government land (Mwebaza 1999). Beyond inheritance, customary law usually 
requires approval of village/tribal elders when selling a parcel of land; in some cases, the parcel can be 
sold to an outsider only if no other member of the community wishes to purchase the parcel (Baland et al. 
2007). This allows village elders to maintain homogeneity in their community, as well as to stop hasty 
and irrational land sales that would leave families landless. In addition, mortgaging of customary land is 
almost unheard of, much for the same reasons that sale of land is closely guarded (Mwebaza 1999). 
Nevertheless, events in Uganda’s history, including colonization, have created new forms of tenure with 
new land rights.  
In 1900 the Uganda Agreement was signed between the British government and the Kingdom of 
Buganda. This agreement allowed the British to establish control over Uganda. In exchange, the British 
granted large tracts of land—19,600 square miles (mainly in central Uganda where the Buganda kingdom 
existed)—to the kabaka (king) and other dignitaries from within the kingdom. The land was measured in 
square miles, giving birth to the term mailo, which has now become the most difficult tenure status to 
address (Coldham 2000). Originally, the land was given with freehold rights, including the ability to rent, 
sell, or mortgage the land (Aluma et al. 1993). But, as much of the land lay unutilized, outsiders began 
squatting on the land and became known as kibanja holders. These kibanja tenants began to acquire legal 
status, which in turn curbed the rights of the mailo owners while increasing those of the occupants 
(Aluma et al. 1993). This competition of rights between the mailo owners and the tenants continues today 
and remains a serious problem.
2 
In addition to customary and mailo tenure status, early experiments with freehold land tenure 
occurred but were not widespread. Under the Agreement of 1900, a small amount of freehold land was 
allotted, mainly in the western region of the country, including parts of the districts of Mbarara, Bushenyi, 
Kasese, Kabarole, Kabale, and others (Aluma et al. 1993). The crown also granted another form of 
freehold, adjudicated freehold, given to churches and a few favored elites (Rugadya 1999). Adjudicated 
freehold conferred the same rights as freehold status, including the ability to acquire title and use the land 
as the owner wished. 
In 1958, the Ugandan government sought to establish freehold tenure through a pilot program 
(Crown Lands Rules of 1958) conducted in the districts that are now known as Mbarara, Bushenyi, 
Kasese, Kabarole, Kabale, Kisoro, and Rukungiri (all located in the western region of the country) and 
Mbale and Kapchorwa (in the eastern region of the country) (Mugambwa 2007; Kamusiime, Rugadya, 
and Obaikol 2005; Kisamba-Mugerwa 1992).  
Uganda continued under British rule with these three land tenures until 1962, when the country 
became independent. Just prior to independence, the British passed the Public Lands Act of 1962, which 
allowed Ugandans to settle on unoccupied government land. This act also forced the government to 
compensate and relocate customary occupants of land that the government had granted to others 
(Mugambwa 2007). Only 13 years later the tables turned when many Ugandans lost the right to their land 
as a result of the 1975 Land Reform Decree of President Idi Amin. The decree set forth that all land in 
Uganda was public land, with all forms of tenure converted into 99-year government leases. In addition to 
                                                      
2 The amendment to the Land Act of 1998 that is currently under debate deals largely with the rights of lawful occupants 
versus those of owners, in regard to unlawful evictions (Parliament of Uganda 2008).   
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the loss of ownership, tenure was weakened even further by the government’s new authority to confiscate 
land without consent (Hunt 2004).  
Not for 20 more years was the issue of land tenure again addressed. The 1995 constitution sought 
to rectify the situation by first declaring that all the land of Uganda belongs to its citizens. In addition, the 
constitution established the four current land tenure holdings: freehold, customary, mailo, and leasehold. 
The document did not, however, address rights, implementation, or enforcement, but instead demanded 
parliament to develop a land act handling these issues within two years (Coldham 2000). To accomplish 
this monumental task, Uganda looked to the experiences of other countries and to their African neighbors 
for guidance.  
Uganda shares borders with Tanzania and Kenya, two countries that took divergent tenure paths, 
between which Uganda sought a balance. In 1956 the colonial government of Kenya desired tability in the 
country, and thought it could be achieved by surveying and titling all of the customary land in the 
country. In contrast, Tanzania abolished all private landownership in the name of equity and forbade the 
buying, selling, or renting of land (Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994). Having witnessed the consequences of 
each country’s decision, the government of Uganda sought a balance between the movement to free 
markets and the need to respect the customary laws of the people.  
The resulting 1998 Land Act defined the rights of the four current classifications of tenure: 
freehold, leasehold, mailo, and customary.
3 Freehold tenure allows the owner to use the land as seen fit, 
whether to sell, lease, or mortgage the land. To avoid confusion, title for the land may be obtained 
(Government of Uganda 1998, Land Act, Sec. 4.3). As a concession during the drafting of the act, mailo 
status was reinstated and given all the rights of freehold. However, mailo owners’ use of their land 
became subject to the rights of lawful occupants.
4 These occupants are required pay the mailo owners 
only a nominal rent, not to exceed 1,000 Ugandan shillings per year, which is less than US$1 per year 
(Sec. 32.5). Additionally, occupants must be consulted before the owner undertakes action with the land 
(Sec. 4.4); thus, mailo owners have only very limited rights, unlike freehold landowners. Therefore, mailo 
owners have been excluded from our analysis because we expect mailo ownership or title to have little 
impact on credit access. Nevertheless, this issue is worthy of further investigation.  
Leasehold tenure is a carryover from Amin’s era, with many households still under land leases 
from the government, while others are traditional leases held by private citizens. Those occupants holding 
land leases from the government do have the ability to convert to freehold land as laid out by the Land 
Act (Sec. 29). Therefore, leasehold is also excluded from the analysis because leasehold does not provide 
the right to mortgage the land and because this form of tenure is relatively rare, with very few 
observations in our data. Regarding customary tenure, the Land Act chose to recognize the customary 
power and rights that still exist in Uganda, but it includes provisions for converting customary tenure to 
freehold. Customary rights are contingent on local customs. “Any decision taken in respect of land held 
under customary tenure…shall be in accordance with the custom, traditions and practices of the 
community concerned” (Sec. 28). If allowed under the customary law of the land, the owner may sell, 
lease, or mortgage the land; but as noted previously, these occurrences are very limited (Baland et al. 
2007; Mwebaza 1999). Owners may obtain a certificate of customary ownership, which can be converted 
into freehold title upon surveying of the land (Secs. 5 and 10). It has been over a decade since the passage 
of the Land Act, but its relevance has not diminished; in fact, it appears to have increased.
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3 In addition, the 1998 Land Act established a Land Commission and Land Boards. The Land Commission is responsible for 
the management of government-owned land, while the Land Boards are charged with conducting land registrations and transfers 
at the district level (Secs. 47 and 57). The Land Tribunals were created at the district level to handle land disputes (Sec 75). The 
Land Act failed to identify a source of funding for these new endeavors. 
4 These lawful occupants are defined as having lived on the land for at least 12 years or with the owner’s permission, 
therefore enjoying occupancy security while paying a nominal rent. Lawful occupants may also apply for a certificate of 
occupancy, which can be inherited or sublet (Sec. 30). However, if the land is left unattended for three or more years, the 
occupancy lapses and the mailo owner regains control of the land. 
5 Unfortunately, there are no reliable estimates of the extent of titling since 1998.  
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5.  SURVEY DATA 
The survey was conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in 2005–2006 at both the household and 
parcel level. The last Ugandan household survey was conducted in 2002–2003 and included questions 
about labor and the informal sector. In contrast, this survey included an agricultural module in addition to 
the standard socioeconomic household questionnaire. These surveys are used as an assessment tool for 
Uganda’s progress toward meeting the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals and the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (Uganda Bureau of Statistics [UBOS] 2006).  
Questions in the socioeconomic component of the survey pertained to education, health, 
employment, living conditions, household assets, loans, expenditures, and welfare indicators. The 
agricultural portion consisted of questions about ownership rights, usage rights, investments, crops, 
inputs, land characteristics, cattle, and agricultural knowledge.  
To draw the sample, two-stage sampling was used; the first stage drew enumerations areas (EAs) 
using probability proportional to size (PPS). The technique of PPS results in the probability of an EA’s 
being selected as proportional to its size/population (Rosén 1997). The second stage then used stratified 
random sampling to select the households. The households were categorized by land and farming status, 
resulting in four classifications: non-farming households, small-scale farm households (with less than 2.5 
acres), medium-scale farm households (more than 2.5 but less than 5 acres), and large-scale farm 
households (5 acres or more). After the households were classified, they were then selected to 
proportionately represent the EA, with 10 households in each EA. If all of the EA was involved in 
agriculture, then all 10 households would be asked to participate in the agricultural survey; if half of the 
EA owned 5 acres or more, half of the households surveyed would have 5 acres or more (UBOS 2006).  
To collect the data, two visits were made to each household: the first visit was between May and 
October 2005, and the second visit was between November 2005 and April 2006. On the first visit the 
agricultural module was administered to every household that was engaged in agricultural activities. The 
socioeconomic survey was also administered at this time, but only to 5 out of the 10 households in each 
EA. During the second visit the agricultural section was again administered to all that were involved in 
agriculture, while the socioeconomic survey was given to the other 5 households that did not receive the 
survey in the previous visit. The result was 783 EAs (including 30 in internally displaced persons camps) 
selected, with a total of 7,426 households comprised of 42,227 members surveyed, covering every district 
in Uganda. The agricultural survey included 13,990 parcels, of which 9,144 were under ownership rights, 
while 4,846 parcels were under usage rights.  
Though a well-drawn sample, UBOS did encounter some possible problems and resulting 
constraints with the data. In the agricultural module, the farmer was asked the size of the parcel. In some 
circumstances the farmers did not know or could only make a guess about the size. To overcome this 
problem, surveyors intended to use a GPS tool to measure all parcels. Unfortunately, many respondents 
and/or communities refused to allow measurements of land to be taken (UBOS 2006). Additionally, 
measurements were not taken at all for households in IDP camps because the parcels were usually far 
from the camp (UBOS 2006). Therefore, this paper will use the GPS calculations when they are available, 
and will replace those missing GPS values with the farmers’ estimates. Additional problems arose with 
the timing of the two visits. The information that was collected on the agricultural activities occurred 
many months before the survey, thus relying on the recall abilities of the households and creating the 
potential for errors in recollection. 
From the 7,426 households, 5,877 were agricultural households, and from those, 4,672 have 
ownership rights over at least one parcel of land. Since the survey distinguished between ownership and 
usage, the decision was made to focus on those with ownership, as the purpose of the law is to develop a 
pathway to landownership. From that sample of 4,672 landowners, 4,113 were classified as rural; and 
with some trimming of outliers from the data, the ultimate subset for this paper was 3,890.
6 Once the 
                                                      
6 Trimming included outliers of age, ownership years, and size of land, (i.e. age greater than 99 years and land size greater  
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sample was refined, it was necessary to make a decision on which households to use. There was the need 
to match up parcel-level data with the household-level credit data, and difficulty arose with households 
owning multiple parcels of land. The solution was to use all of the households and classify them by their 
land characteristics. 
The first classification of households was by tenure status: freehold, leasehold, mailo, or 
customary. When households were encountered that held parcels in different tenures, then only one tenure 
status was selected.
7 For those with freehold and another tenure status, freehold became the classification. 
The idea is that if a household has one parcel of freehold, then that is most likely the parcel that would be 
used for loan security; thus the household was classified as a freehold household. Mailo and leasehold, 
since they do not confer complete ownership rights and the ability to mortgage, were discarded from the 
sample of analysis. The remaining households were wholly customary, as these are the intended target of 
the Land Act. This need for classification could have been overcome only by the use of single-parcel 
households; unfortunately, the sample became limited and the number with title was very small, so this 
course was not pursued.
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than 400 acres).  
7 The overlapping of tenure only occurred with 30 households: 1 freehold and mailo; 22 freehold and customary; 1 leasehold 
and mailo; and 6 leasehold and customary. 
8 When restricted to single-parcel households, the sample was cut in half to a mere 1,900 households, of which only 
6percent processed title (the majority of which were mailo). The analysis was conducted using these households, but the sample 
size appeared to hinder the significance of the results (no statistically significant differences were found across tenure types or 
access to title/certificate).  Results are available from the author upon request.  
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6.  METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Do land tenure and title affect access to credit? To answer this question a proper counterfactual is 
required: a comparison between households that are alike in all aspects, but differ in their possession of 
title or tenure status. Ideally, the data would be randomized and in longitudinal form, from which 
comparison could occur over time between those who began without title and those who obtained title 
later, to investigate how this impacted their credit access (reflexive or double difference analysis). 
However, this survey is not panel data.
9 With these circumstances, ordinary least squares (OLS) or 
instrumental variables (IV) could be used, but matching was instead selected because of its ability to 
reduce sensitivity to parametric assumptions and its use of common support (reducing the impact of 
outliers), thus minimizing bias in the results.
10 A variety of methods for matching exist, such as nearest 
neighbor, n-nearest neighbors, and kernel matching, which all use propensity score matching (PSM). This 
paper will use kernel PSM. In addition, the Abadie and Imbens method of matching, which matches on a 
distance metric based on the values of the covariates (e.g., an inner product of the difference in covariate 
values divided by the standard deviation of the covariates) instead of propensity score, will also be 
utilized (Abadie et al. 2004). Each method has its advantages and disadvantages, which will be discussed.  
This paper uses the method of PSM developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). “Matching is a 
method of sampling from a large reservoir of potential controls to produce a control group of modest size 
in which the distribution of covariates is similar to the distribution in the treated group” (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983, pg 48). This method seeks to match “treatment” (e.g., with title) and control (e.g., without 
title) households that are similar in terms of their observable characteristics that are expected to jointly 
affect the tenure and title status, and access to credit, such as household and land characteristics. If 
multiple variables are being matched upon, some distance metric is needed to aggregate the 
multidimensional values of the covariates into a single scalar for matching. PSM is based on matching on 
the estimated probability (or “propensity score”) of observations being in the treated group, P(X). This 
assumes that matching on P(X) is as valid as matching on X. With this method of matching, the relevant 
characteristics are first identified, vector X, then inserted into a probit model to predict titling or tenure.
11 
From the probit, a propensity score is found; this is the probability of the household participating in the 
titling program conditional on vector X, P(X) = Pr(d=1|X) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Jalan and 
Ravallion 2003a & 2003b; Meng and Ryan 2004; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1998). Using this 
propensity score, which represents the probability of participating in the program (titling or tenure status 
in our case), a counterfactual is identified, having a similar propensity score, allowing treated and 
untreated households to be matched. 
After running a probit of household characteristics (which are noted below) on title or tenure 
status (using each of the four binary comparisons previously mentioned), a propensity score will be 
predicted for each household. This score is the predicted probability of being treated (whether or not 
actually treated), allowing households to be matched using this score that represents observable 
characteristics of the household.  
In kernel matching, the treatment household is matched with a weighted average of all the control 
households, with greater weight given to “closer” households (Heckman et al. 1998; Jalan and Ravallion 
2003a; Gilligan and Hoddinott 2006). Different forms of weighting exist that can be used with kernel 
                                                      
9 Though questions were asked during two different crop seasons, this is not relevant to the credit question. Regarding credit 
access, the question was asked if the household has access to credit now and  also in 2001. This answer is not assumed to 
constitute panel data as the respondent may suffer from recall inconsistencies and the fact that the Land Act of 1998 was already 
in place (ideal panel data would have baseline information prior to the passage of the act). 
10 Matching only deals with selection on observables, while IV estimation can address problems of selection on 
unobservables.  
11 Other models could be used to predict the propensity score, such as a logit model. A probit model assumes that the error 
in the participation equation is normally distributed; other assumptions about this error term would yield different models.  
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matching; this paper will use the normal density weighting function.
1213 The advantage of kernel over 
other PSM, such as the nearest neighbor or five nearest neighbors, is the reduction in variance in the 
matching estimate achieved by the introduction of data from all the control households in the matching 
process. In addition, common support was used on all the analysis groups to decrease the bias by 
dropping outliers that are incomparable.
14 However, kernel matching may also increase bias if the sample 
size is small by giving consideration to scores that are far from the treated score that is being matched 
(Heckman and Smith 1999). Fortunately, this data set from Uganda has a substantial number of 
counterfactual “control” observations that will minimize the concerns about sample size.  
Another problem with two-stage matching is the increased variance in the results. The second 
stage of matching uses predicted values from the first stage, without considering that those predicted 
values have their own standard errors, influencing the standard error of the outcome and increasing its 
variation. This paper attempts to overcome this with bootstrapping. The equation is bootstrapped using 50 
replications, resulting in 50 estimated treatment effects on the households. The result is a distribution (and 
standard error) of the sample that approximates that of the population (Efron and Tibshirani 1993; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). However, a paper by Abadie and Imbens (2006a) showed that using 
bootstrapping on nearest neighbor PSM produces incorrect standard errors. To overcome this problem, 
the Abadie and Imbens method of matching, which does produce correct standard errors, is also 
conducted.  
The Abadie and Imbens method of matching was developed to overcome some of the problems 
present in PSM, including biases that remain even for large sample sizes and suffering from inefficiency 
losses (Abadie and Imbens, 2002). As noted above, the Abadie and Imbens matching method does not use 
propensity scores to match. As an alternative to using predicted probability, this method matches using 
the differences in the values of the covariates, weighted by a matrix, to create a distance metric of 
nearness.
15 The advantage of this method is that the correct standard errors are calculated, and it allows 
for a bias correction. Some user specifications to the Abadie and Imbens matching included estimating the 
average treatment effect for the treated (ATT), which allows for easy comparison with the other matching 
method. The number of matches per observation was specified at five nearest neighbors. As mentioned 
earlier, the bias-corrected matching estimator was used, which “…adjusts the difference within the 
matches for the differences in their covariate values” (Abadie et al. 2004). Since the matching occurs on 
covariates and is combined with the bias adjustment, bias is decreased (Abadie et al. 2004). This method, 
however, is not without its weaknesses; its nearest neighbor method is more arbitrary than PSM because it 
uses an arbitrary distance metric based on the covariates to match—a metric that does not give greater 
weight to covariates that have greater impact on the participation decision, as does the PSM distance 
metric (Pender and Ndjeunga 2008). Because only covariates that jointly affect participation and 
outcomes can bias the estimated impacts if left out of the analysis (i.e., those that affect outcomes but not 
participation do not bias impact estimates because the error term should then be uncorrelated with 
participation), it is intuitive that giving greater weight to such covariates, as PSM implicitly does, yields a 
more defensible distance metric. 
Incorporated in both methods of analysis are the covariates from the data. These include 
characteristics of the land and household (see Table 2). The focus is mainly on characteristics of the 
parcel that may impact tenure and titling. The first set of variables is concerned with the quality of the 
soil. The survey asked owners to describe the quality of their soil as good, fair, or poor; however, soil 
measurements were not taken to verify these statements. The next set addresses the topography of the 
parcel; the types were hilly, gentle slope, steep slope, flat, or valley. These land characteristics become 
important because people may be willing to obtain or desire tenure and greater security if they have better 
                                                      
12 We also used the Epanechnikov kernel weighting function in one set of analyses. The results were little different from the 
results using the normal density weighting function. 
13 For further information on the Kernel Matching Formula see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998. 
14 The only incidence of dropped observations due to a lack of common support was for comparison of freehold with title 
and customary with title; four observations were dropped. 
15 For further information on the Abadie and Imbens Matching Formula please see Abadie et al. 2004.  
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quality land. To control for these parcel characteristics with households that have multiple parcels, 
proportions were introduced, that is, the proportion of all the land owned that is of good soil, similar to 
the method used in Nkonya et al. (2004). Instead of assuming that all parcels are of the same soil type or 
of the same topography, proportions allow a truer representation of all the land owned. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
             
Sex of the head of the household (=1 if male)  3890  0.7611825  0.4264158  0  1 
School attendance dummy for head of 
household   (=1 if attended school)  3881 0.8003092 0.3998194  0  1 
Age of the head of the household  3890  44.47404  15.52458  13  90 
Number of adult males in the household (18 
years or older)  3890 1.177121  0.8438003  0  9 
Number of adult females in the household (18 
years or older)  3890 1.278149  0.7604661  0  7 
Materials of the roof (=1 if purchased materials, 
i.e., tiles, cement, or tin)  3890 0.5514139 0.4974135  0  1 
           
Soil type/land quality of the parcel is good (=1)  3890  0.4161432  0.4621202  0  1 
Soil type/land quality of the parcel is fair (=1)  3890  0.4637649  0.463652  0  1 
Soil type/land quality of the parcel  is poor (=1)  3890  0.1200919  0.3036869  0  1 
            
Topography of the parcel is hilly (=1)  3890  0.0951006  0.2739194  0  1 
Topography of the parcel is flat (=1)  3890  0.4644792  0.4713639  0  1 
Topography of the parcel is gentle slope (=1)  3890  0.389419  0.4535339  0  1 
Topography of the parcel is steep slope (=1)  3890  0.032442  0.1587441  0  1 
Topography of the parcel is valley (=1)  3890  0.0184307  0.1140434  0  1 
Topography of the parcel is other (=1)  3890  0.0001285  0.0080167  0  1 
             
AEZ bimodal_medium (=1)  3890  0.1305913  0.3369961  0  1 
AEZ bimodal_high (=1)  3890  0.2084833  0.4062763  0  1 
AEZ unimodal_very_low (=1)  3890  0.0239075  0.1527805  0  1 
AEZ unimodal_low (=1)  3890  0.0251928  0.1567305  0  1 
AEZ unimodal_medium (=1)  3890  0.0089974  0.0944392  0  1 
AEZ unimodal_high (=1)  3890  0.0894602  0.2854435  0  1 
             
AEZ bimodal_low_medium (=1)  3890  0.0390746  0.1937973  0  1 
AEZ bimodal_medium_high (=1)  3890  0.1426735  0.3497846  0  1 
AEZ bimodal_low_high (=1)  3890  0.1395887  0.3466043  0  1 
AEZ unimodal_low_medium (=1)  3890  0.1200514  0.3250634  0  1 
AEZ bimodal_unimodal_medium (=1)  3890  0.0719794  0.2584871  0  1 
Source: Compiled by authors.  
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Other variables related to land include the size of the land. As land size increases there may be a 
greater need to increase security of the land through title in order to fend off squatters or boundary 
disputes (Roth et al.1994). Another aspect that may impact tenure and title is the labor endowment of the 
household, expressed through the number of males and females above the age of 18, who presumably can 
and do work the land. A greater number of adults could decrease the propensity to title land because there 
would be a greater number of people watching over and caring for the land. On the other hand, to 
discourage infighting and family feuds there may be an incentive to secure tenure and titling of the land. 
With regard to the household, control variables of the household head are included: sex, age, and school 
attendance.  
The final set of covariates is the agro-ecological zones (AEZs) as fixed effects. These fixed 
effects attempt to control for unobservable differences in the land and climate of Uganda in different 
locations that may influence tenure and title, and access to credit. The AEZs were classified based on 
seasonal rainfall pattern, length of growing period, and annual rainfall and temperature potential to create 
seven zones in Uganda (Ruecker et al. 2003). The seven categories are named for their rainy seasons 
(unimodal, or “uni,” for one rainy season; and bimodal, or “bi,” for two rainy seasons) and for their 
agricultural potential (including high, medium, low, and very low). The resulting categories are 
uni_very_low, uni_low, uni_med, uni_hi, bi_low, bi_med, and bi_high. These zones were mapped onto 
Uganda using GIS techniques (see Figure 1). The hope in the present study was to match the data from 
the UBOS survey, which included GPS locations of households, with the geo-referenced zones. However, 
difficulties arose when mapping the locations of the survey households, and so exact mapping was 
abandoned in favor of district-level matching.
16 Using the Uganda data from Ruecker et al. (2003), each 
district was classified by the zone it fell into. Some districts fell into two zones, resulting in the creation 
of five more, mixed categories: bi_low_med, bi_med_high, bi_low_high, uni_low_medm, bi_uni_med. 
The resulting 12 categories allow classification of each district by its agricultural characteristics, which 
may not have been observed in the survey and contain distinctly different characteristics. By examining 
Figure 1 it is evident that the northern portion of the country experiences only one rainy season and has 
lower agricultural potential than the bimodal central and southern portions of Uganda. These differences 
may impact tenure and security; thus the fixed effects will control for unobserved difference between the 
zones. 
 
                                                      
16 The coordinates from the survey were in UTM, and upon transforming them into latitude and longitude, problems were 
encountered. Most households were mapped in Egypt and the DRC.  
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Figure 1 Uganda’s  agro-ecological zones  
 




7.  DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
Before econometric analysis is undertaken, an in-depth investigation into the descriptive statistics can 
provide a solid foundation for understanding and interpreting the data. Of the 3,890 rural households, 75 
percent are of customary tenure and 5 percent are of freehold tenure; the remainder are mailo (19 percent) 
and leasehold (1 percent). Interestingly, all of the tenures except customary are heavily concentrated in 
one of the regions of the country: the majority of freehold are in the western region (61 percent), the 
mailo are clustered in the central region (98 percent—not surprising considering the mailo status applies 
mainly to the Buganda kingdom, located in central Uganda), and leasehold is mostly in the central as well 
(61 percent); but customary is spread throughout the rest of the country (39 percent in eastern, 31 percent 
in western, and 28 percent in the northern; see Table 3). 
Table 3. Tenure by region in number of households 
   Region 
Tenure Central  Eastern  Northern Western  Total 
           
Freehold 19.00  60.00  5.00  129.00  213.00 
Row  %  8.92 28.17  2.35 60.56  100.00 
Col  %  2.33 4.96 0.60  12.50 5.48 
            
Leasehold  19.00 3.00 2.00 7.00  31.00 
Row %  61.29  9.68  6.45  22.58  100.00 
Col  %  2.33 0.25 0.24 0.68 0.80 
            
Mailo  717.00 7.00 0.00 7.00  731.00 
Row  %  98.08 0.96 0.00 0.96  100.00 
Col  %  87.76 0.58 0.00 0.68  18.79 
            
Customary  41.00  1140.00 824.00 888.00  2893.00 
Row  %  1.42 39.41 28.48 30.69  100.00 
Col  %  5.02 94.21 99.16 86.05 74.37 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
There also appear to be regional differences in access to credit that are statistically significant 
(see Table 4). Access to credit hovers around 50 percent for all four regions but is highest in the northern 
region, at 57 percent. Informal rates are nearly the same at around half the population; again the north is 
the highest with 55 percent access. As for formal credit, access rates are around one fifth for the central, 
eastern, and western regions; however, in the north the rate jumps to 36 percent. One possibility for 
greater access in the north may be the concentration of government resources in the development and 
reconstruction of this region after the intense civil war with the Lord’s Resistance Army. Table 4b shows 
that the difference in access is driven by differences between individual regions. Significant differences in 
access to credit exist between the western region and the other three regions. For access to informal 




Table 4. Access to credit, formal and informal by region in number of households 
   Access to credit 
Access to  
formal credit 
Access to  
informal credit 
Region  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
              
Central  372.00 444.00  621.00 195.00  380.00 436.00 
%  45.59 54.41  76.10 23.90  46.57 53.43 
Eastern  594.00 616.00  922.00 288.00  606.00 604.00 
%  49.09 50.91  76.20 23.80  50.08 49.92 
Northern  353.00 475.00  523.00 305.00  372.00 456.00 
%  42.63 57.37  63.16 36.84  44.93 55.07 
Western  563.00 467.00  848.00 182.00  566.00 464.00 
%  54.66 45.34  82.33 17.67  54.95 45.05 
Pearson chi2(3)     29.998     92.896     22.137 
Pr     0.000     0.000     0.000 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Table 4b. Comparison of credit access by region 
   Access to credit   Access to formal credit  Access to informal credit 
   Central Eastern Northern Central Eastern Northern Central Eastern Northern
                         
Eastern  -0.0350    -0.0010      -0.0351     
   0.538    1.000      0.536     
                        
Northern 0.0296 0.0646   0.1294 0.1303     0.0164 0.0516     
   0.790 0.024   0.000 0.000     0.985 0.125     
                        
Western -0.0907 -0.0557  -0.1203 -0.0623 -0.0613 -0.1917 -0.0838  -0.0487 -0.1002
   0.001 0.049  0.000 0.011 0.004  0.000 0.002 0.122  0.000
F        10.07        31.69       7.41
p 
value        0.000        0.000       0.001
Source: Compiled by authors. 
With regard to credit access, the comparison of access between freehold and customary tenure 
may appear counterintuitive. Of all freehold households, 57 percent have access to any form of credit, 
compared with 50 percent of customary households that have access to any form of credit, a difference 
that is significant at the 10 percent level. For formal credit, 21 percent of freehold households have 
access, and 26 percent of customary households have access, a difference that is not significant. For 
informal credit, a significant difference does exist: 57 percent of freehold households have access, and 
only 49 percent of customary households have access (see Table 5). It appears that when considering only 
tenure and not title, freehold increases overall access, driven by greater access to informal credit, but 
customary households surprisingly have somewhat greater access to formal credit (though this difference 
is not statistically significant).  
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Table 5. Access to credit, formal and informal, by tenure in number of households 
   Access to credit 
Access to  
formal credit 
Access to  
informal credit 
Tenure        No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
             
Freehold  91.00  122.00 167.00 46.00  91.00  122.00 
%  42.72 57.28  78.40 21.60  42.72 57.28 
Customary  1434.00  1454.00 2146.00 742.00 1468.00  1420.00 
%  49.65 50.35  74.31 25.69  50.83 49.17 
Pearson chi2(1)     3.813     1.756     5.217 
Pr      0.051     0.185     0.022 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Turning to those with formal certificates, less than 10 percent of freehold households have 
certificates of title (21 households), and only 3 percent of customary households have certificates (91 
households). The small percentage of freehold households with certificates of title requires some 
comment. This could be the result either of truly freehold households who have not kept their title up-to-
date or never obtained one, or of households misreporting land as freehold that legally has another rights 
status. Although the Land Act provides that a title may be acquired for freehold land, this is not a 
requirement. Specifically, Section 4.2 of the Land Act states, “For the avoidance of doubt, a freehold title 
may be created which is subject to conditions, restrictions or limitations which may be positive or 
negative in their application, applicable to of the incidents of the tenure” (Government of Uganda 1998). 
This clause leaves room for Ugandans to own freehold land without obtaining a title for the land. Given 
the substantial costs of obtaining a title, which requires a cadastral survey of the land, it is not surprising 
that many households with freehold tenure would not seek titling, particularly if they do not feel 
threatened or see no strong reason to pay these costs. According to the Land and Equity Movement in 
Uganda (pg 1), “surveying is an expensive process, [therefore] only the rich would ever be able to afford 
title.”  
There is also the possibility that people are mistaken about or misreport their land tenure status. 
Only 23 percent of all of the surveyed households that reported having freehold tenure are in the nine 
western and eastern districts, where the pilot land titling program in the late 1950s established freehold 
tenure with title. Therefore, it is possible that people are mistakenly reporting that their land tenure status 
is freehold, when actually the land may be legally of another status. It could be that people in rural 
Uganda have been exposed to the term freehold so much in the past decade that they assume that they 
have freehold status without this being legally true. Nevertheless, if a person does claim that their land is 
freehold, it may imply that the owner feels very secure in the ownership of and control over the land.
17 
Hence, some of those who report that they have freehold tenure may have this status in a de facto sense, 
even if this is not their de jure property rights status. This de facto tenure security may be as important as, 
or even more important than, the de jure status of the land, especially in accessing informal credit. 
Combining freehold and customary households, those with titles or certificates experience nearly 
the same rates of access to credit as those without titles or certificates (Table 6). Of the freehold 
households with titles, their access to any form of credit is nearly identical to customary households with 
                                                      
17 The belief in the security of ownership held by the owner may be sufficient for lenders (especially informal lenders) 
because there is the possibility that land tenure status is used only as a screening device and not as collateral that can be 
repossessed. For example, in this survey, only 23.5 percent of borrowers from formal banking institutions and only 25 percent of 
borrowers from microfinance institutions used land as collateral. In total, only 12 percent of all borrowers were required to use 
land as collateral; the result is land’s losing its significance as collateral and instead land tenure potentially being used as a 
screening device. The analytical results reported below support this interpretation.  
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certificates (52 percent for freehold households with titles, 51 percent for customary households with 
certificates). Concerning formal credit, the rate of access is slightly in favor of freehold with a title, as 
would be expected (29 percent for freehold with a title and 26 percent for customary with a certificate). 
However, of households without a title or certificate, customary has greater access to formal credit (21 
percent for freehold without a title and 26 percent for customary without a certificate). With regard to 
accessing informal credit, freehold households with titles of ownership do slightly better than customary 
households with certificates, 52 percent versus 48 percent, respectively. None of the differences are 
significant, however, even at the 10 percent level. With these results in mind, further econometric analysis 
is required. This will help to determine the effects of tenure and certificate on access to credit, as factors 
that are biasing the descriptive analysis (i.e., AEZs, land quality, or human capital endowments) may 
exist.  
Table 6. Access to credit, formal and informal, by certificate of title/ownership in number of 
households 
   Access to Credit  Access to Formal Credit  Access to Informal Credit 
Certificate  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
            
Yes  120.00 123.00 181.00  62.00 124.00 119.00 
%  49.38 50.62 74.49 25.51 51.03 48.97 
No  1762.00 1879.00 2733.00  908.00 1800.00  1841.00 
%  48.39 51.61 75.06 24.94 49.44  50.56 
Pearson 
chi2(1)     0.089     0.040     0.231 
Pr      0.765     0.841     0.631 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Results of Matching Estimators 
First, the probit was run on the sample with the previously specified variables (see Table 7). The 
balancing properties of each of the four samples were then tested to ensure there were no significant 
differences in the observable characteristics between the matched treatment and control groups (see Table 
8). The purpose of the balancing test is to see whether there are statistically significant differences 
between the means of the matched treated and control groups. The results suggest that the propensity 
score performed well in matching. Although there were statistically significant differences in several 
covariates between the unmatched samples, the only significant differences (at 10 percent level) for the 
matched variables were for the age of household head in comparing customary owners with and without 
certificates, for the gender of the household head in comparing freehold households with a title to 
customary households with a customary certificate, and for the number of adult females in the household 
in comparing freehold and customary households with a title or certificate. In most cases, the difference 
between the mean values of covariates was lower for the matched than for the unmatched samples, and 
not very large. Still, there may be bias resulting from imperfect matching using PSM. The Abadie and 
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Variable          
              
Attend 0.067    -0.148    -0.022    0.275**  
   (0.143)    (0.431)    (0.591)    (0.118) 
Male -0.071    -0.084    -0.522    -0.156 
   (0.138)    (0.379)    (0.550)    (0.111) 
Age 0.004    0.007    0.018    0.004 
   (0.004)    (0.010)    (0.014)    (0.003) 
Adult males  0.166***    0.217    -0.238    0.003 
   (0.054)    (0.181)    (0.185)    (0.054) 
Adult females   0.131**     -0.155    -0.247    0.063 
   (0.059)    (0.201)    (0.216)    (0.050) 
Roof construction  0.326**     0.701    1.948***    0.097 
   (0.128)    (0.430)    (0.688)    (0.091) 
Land quality good  -0.071    0.168    0.965*       0.272*** 
   (0.116)    (0.352)    (0.526)    (0.091) 
Land quality poor  0.118  -0.007  0.747    0.219 
   (0.182)  (0.480)  (0.642)    (0.141) 
Topography hilly   0.330*    1.988***   2.016***    -0.075 
   (0.195)  (0.560)  (0.733)    (0.165) 
Topography slope  0.198  1.032**   0.889     0.288*** 
   (0.126)  (0.473)  (0.573)    (0.093) 
Topography steep slope  0.701***  -  -    -0.423 
   (0.251)  -  -    (0.357) 
Topography valley  0.147  1.145  2.047*      0.255 
   (0.415)  (0.990)  (1.151)    (0.339) 
AEZ 3  0.408  0.132   -1.277*       -0.355*** 
   (0.249)  (0.407)  (0.697)    (0.117) 
AEZ 6  0.7  -  -     -1.056*** 
   (0.504)  -  -    (0.319) 
AEZ 7  -0.018  -  -     -1.451*** 
   (0.290)  -  -    (0.238) 
AEZ 9  0.587**   -0.478   -2.145***     -0.193*   
   (0.240)  (0.434)  (0.745)    (0.109) 
AEZ 10   0.680***  -0.102   -2.028***     -0.655*** 




Table 7. Continued 
 
Customary 













        
        
Variable          
          
AEZ 11  0.636**   2.409**    -1.393*       -1.838*** 
   (0.264)  (1.084)  (0.828)    (0.332) 
AEZ 12   0.809***  -  -     -1.631*** 
   (0.269)  -  -    (0.340) 
_cons   -3.239***   -3.038***    -1.908*       -1.675*** 
   (0.338)  (0.859)  (1.126)    (0.219) 
Pseudo R2  0.087   0.250   0.341     0.152  
N  2692   202   86     2855 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Notes: No freehold plots were found in AEZ 4 and 6. No customary reside in AEZ 8. No freehold with title reside in AEZ 7, 8, or 
12. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 8. Balancing test results (pstest) 
   Customary with & without certificate  Freehold with & without title 
     Mean    Mean    
Variable         Sample  Treated  Control   p>|t|  Treated  Control   p>|t| 
Attend Unmatched  0.78652 0.7808 0.898 0.80952  0.83854  0.735 
   Matched  0.78652 0.7191 0.300 0.80952  0.95238  0.160 
Male Unmatched  0.77778 0.7777 0.999 0.7619  0.77083  0.927 
   Matched 0.77528 0.74157 0.602 0.7619 0.7619  1.000 
Age Unmatched  48.067 43.588 0.006*** 51.095  45.568  0.127 
   Matched  47.708 51.742 0.072* 51.095 55.286  0.408 
Adult Males  Unmatched  1.5889 1.1619 0.000*** 1.8095  1.2552  0.007*** 
   Matched  1.5955 1.618 0.897 1.8095  1.7619  0.903 
Adult Females  Unmatched  1.6222 1.2673 0.000*** 1.4762  1.4063  0.765 
   Matched  1.618 1.5169 0.529 1.4762  1.5238  0.865 
Roof  Construction  Unmatched  0.700 0.45926 0.000*** 0.90476 0.67188 0.028** 
   Matched  0.69663 0.65169 0.525 0.90476  0.80952  0.390 
Land Quality Good  Unmatched  0.39529 0.43539 0.418 0.50302  0.46291  0.717 
   Matched  0.3885 0.40362 0.826 0.50302  0.63925  0.349 
Land Quality Poor  Unmatched  0.11479 0.09104 0.402 0.15986  0.11895  0.579 
   Matched  0.11608 0.09188 0.578 0.15986  0.19048  0.796 
Topography Hilly  Unmatched  0.10856 0.08222 0.335 0.36413  0.07792  0.000*** 
   Matched  0.10978 0.09809 0.776 0.36413  0.32974  0.809 
Topography Slope  Unmatched  0.40056 0.33961 0.192 0.47062  0.46847  0.984 
   Matched  0.40506 0.4448 0.561 0.47062  0.59613  0.391  
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Table 8. Continued 
   Customary with & without certificate  Freehold with & without title 
     Mean    Mean    
Topography Steep Slope  Unmatched  0.07642 0.0353 0.022** 0.000  0.01338  0.577 
   Matched  0.07727 0.05506 0.509 0.000  0.000  . 
Topography Valley  Unmatched  0.02648 0.01598 0.348 0.04762  0.01954  0.346 
    Matched  0.02678 0.0172 0.550 0.04762 0.000 0.323 
Topography Other  Unmatched  0.000 0.00018 0.858 0.000  0.000  . 
   Matched  0.000 0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AZE 3  Unmatched  0.18889 0.15475 0.380 0.33333  0.22396  0.264 
   Matched  0.19101 0.11236 0.145 0.33333  0.38095  0.755 
AZE 4  Unmatched  0.000 0.03324 0.079* 0.000  0.000  . 
   Matched  0.000 0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AZE 5  Unmatched  0.000 0.03431 0.074* 0.000  0.01042  0.640 
   Matched  0.000 0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AZE 6  Unmatched  0.01111 0.01215 0.929 0.000  0.000  . 
   Matched  0.01124 0.02247 0.563 0.000  0.000  . 
AZE 7  Unmatched  0.05556 0.11901 0.065** 0.000  0.01563  0.566 
   Matched  0.05618 0.03371 0.472 0.000  0.000  . 
AZE 8  Unmatched  0.000 0.000 . 0.000  0.01042  0.640 
   Matched  0.000 0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AZE 9  Unmatched  0.24444 0.1644 0.045** 0.28571  0.32292  0.730 
    Matched 0.24719 0.29213 0.502 0.28571 0.2381  0.733 
AZE 10  Unmatched  0.23333 0.10579 0.000*** 0.14286  0.08854  0.420 
   Matched  0.22472 0.26966 0.490 0.14286  0.19048  0.688 
AZE 11  Unmatched  0.12222 0.16154 0.317 0.04762  0.00521  0.056* 
   Matched  0.1236 0.1573 0.520 0.04762  0.04762  1.000 
AZE 12  Unmatched  0.11111 0.09578 0.628 0.000  0.00521  0.742 




Table 8. Continued 
  
Freehold & Customary with 
Title/Cert. 
Freehold & Customary without 
Title/ Cert. 
     Mean                Mean     
Variable         Sample  Treated  Control   p>|t|  Treated  Control   p>|t| 
Attend  Unmatched 0.80952 0.78652 0.818 0.83854  0.7808  0.06* 
   Matched  0.80952  0.95238 0.160 0.84211  0.82105  0.585 
Male Unmatched  0.7619  0.77778 0.877 0.77083  0.7777  0.825 
   Matched  0.7619  1.000 0.017** 0.76842  0.69474  0.106 
Age  Unmatched 51.095 48.067 0.416 45.568  43.588  0.081* 
   Matched  51.095  47.619 0.531 45.242  45.321  0.961 
Adult  Males  Unmatched 1.8095 1.5889 0.447 1.2552  1.1619  0.114 
   Matched  1.8095  1.6667 0.692 1.2579  1.1526  0.219 
Adult  Females  Unmatched 1.4762 1.6222 0.523 1.4063  1.2673 0.013** 
    Matched 1.4762  1.3333 0.535 1.4158 1.2526 0.066* 
Roof Construction  Unmatched  0.90476  0.700 0.055* 0.67188  0.45926  0.000*** 
   Matched  0.90476  0.80952 0.390 0.67368  0.71053  0.438 
Land  Quality  Good  Unmatched 0.50302 0.39529 0.340 0.46291  0.43539  0.426 
   Matched  0.50302  0.65872 0.266 0.46778  0.4235  0.365 
Land  Quality  Poor  Unmatched 0.15986 0.11479 0.552 0.11895  0.09104  0.161 
   Matched  0.15986  0.1746 0.894 0.12021  0.12841  0.800 
Topography  Hilly  Unmatched 0.36413 0.10856 0.001*** 0.07792  0.08222  0.820 
   Matched  0.36413  0.22656 0.292 0.07347  0.07682  0.894 
Topography  Slope  Unmatched 0.47062 0.40056 0.528 0.46847  0.33961 0.000*** 
   Matched  0.47062  0.50113 0.832 0.4734  0.50489  0.513 
Topography Steep Slope  Unmatched  0.000  0.07642 0.155 0.01338  0.0353  0.069* 
   Matched  0.000  0.000 . 0.01352  0.00808  0.549 
Topography  Valley  Unmatched 0.04762 0.02648 0.551 0.01954  0.01598  0.648 
   Matched  0.04762  0.02801 0.725 0.01975  0.02214  0.841 
Topography  Other  Unmatched 0.000 0.000 . 0.000  0.00018  0.793 
   Matched  0.000  0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AEZ  3  Unmatched 0.33333 0.18889 0.150 0.22396  0.15475  0.011** 
   Matched  0.33333  0.28571 0.746 0.22632  0.23158  0.903 
AEZ  4  Unmatched 0.000 0.000 . 0.000  0.03324  0.010*** 
   Matched  0.000  0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AEZ  5  Unmatched 0.000 0.000 . 0.01042  0.03431 0.072* 
    Matched 0.000  0.000 . 0.01053 0.000 0.157 
AEZ 6  Unmatched  0.000  0.01111 0.631 0.000  0.01215  0.125 
   Matched  0.000  0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AEZ 7  Unmatched  0.000  0.05556 0.273 0.01563  0.11901  0.000*** 
   Matched  0.000  0.000 . 0.01579  0.01053  0.654  
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Table 8. Continued 
  
Freehold & Customary with 
Title/Cert. 
Freehold & Customary without 
Title/ Cert. 
     Mean                Mean     
AEZ  8  Unmatched 0.000 0.000 . 0.01042  0.000  0.000*** 
   Matched  0.000  0.000 . 0.000  0.000  . 
AEZ  9  Unmatched 0.28571 0.24444 0.698 0.32292  0.1644 0.000*** 
   Matched  0.28571  0.14286 0.270 0.32632  0.33684  0.828 
AEZ  10  Unmatched 0.14286 0.23333 0.369 0.08854  0.10579  0.450 
   Matched  0.14286  0.04762 0.305 0.08947  0.1  0.727 
AEZ  11  Unmatched 0.04762 0.12222 0.326 0.00521  0.16154 0.000*** 
   Matched  0.04762  0.19048 0.160 0.00526  0.00526  1.000 
AEZ 12  Unmatched  0.000  0.11111 0.111 0.00521  0.09578  0.000*** 
   Matched 0.000  0.000 . 0.00526  0.01053 0.563 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Using the kernel PSM and Abadie and Imbens matching methods, the four comparisons of tenure 
and title/certificate were assessed as follows: (1) customary with and without certificate, (2) freehold with 
and without title, (3) freehold with title and customary with certificate, and (4) freehold without title and 
customary without certificate. Each of the four comparisons was then analyzed by the credit accessed, 
including (1) access to any credit, (2) access to informal credit, and (3) access to formal credit. The 
product is 24 impact estimates for the data.  
Table 9 reports the estimated average treatment on the treated (ATT) effects of titling and tenure 
on access to any form of credit.
18 The results for comparison of customary households with certificate and 
without are statistically insignificant, but the direction is as expected. This suggests that, though the effect 
may be small, having a certificate may positively impact access to credit for customary tenure. Matching 
freehold households with and without a title resulted in no impact from the kernel PSM method and a 
negative impact from Abadie and Imbens method, though both estimates are statistically insignificant. 
The interpretation of these results would imply that a title has no impact or even hinders access to credit 
for freehold households. However, caution must be taken, as this is the smallest group of the four, with 
only 21 freehold households having title. Regarding the matching between freehold with title and 
customary with certificate, the result was in the anticipated, positive direction, although not statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. The final matching for access to credit was conducted on freehold and 
customary without certificates, producing statistically significant results. The kernel showed an impact at 
the 10 percent significance level that freehold had a 13 percent better chance of obtaining credit than 
customary households. Results from the Abadie and Imbens estimator were not as large, 9 percent impact, 
but were statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This could imply that title or certificate of 
ownership is not as greatly important as one’s actual tenure status.  
                                                      
18 In comparison 1, customary with title is the treatment and customary without title is the control. In comparison 2, freehold 
with title is the treatment and freehold without title is the control. In comparison 3, freehold with title is the treatment and 




Table 9 Results for access to credit 
Access to any form of credit 
   Customary with and 
without title 
Freehold with and 
without title 
Freehold and customary 
with title 
Freehold and customary 
without title    
   Kernel  Imben Kernel  Imben Kernel  Imben  Kernel  Imben 
ATT 0.133 0.054 0  -0.192 0.263 0.009 0.132*  0.090** 
S.E. -0.11  -0.057  -0.213 -0.124 -0.283 -0.158 -0.077  -0.042 
N  2733 2733  202  202  87  87 2896  2896 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Notes: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; S.E. = Standard Error 
Turning to the impact of tenure and certificate on access to informal credit, the results are similar 
to those of general access to credit. Table 10 provides the ATT results of the kernel and Abadie and 
Imbens matching for each of the four categories. For the first three comparisons, the results are almost 
identical to the previous ones, just as the descriptive statistic showed. A driving force of this may be that 
informal credit is the dominant credit source in most of Uganda, and thus the results differ little between 
access to informal credit and access to any credit. One notable variation occurred for the comparison 
between freehold without certificate and customary without certificate: the statistical significance of the 
kernel PSM results increased from the 10 percent level to the 1 percent level, while the impact remained 
at 13 percent greater access for freehold tenure.  
Table 10 Results for access to informal credit 
Access to Informal Credit Sources 
   Customary with and 
without title 
Freehold with and 
without title 
Freehold and customary 
with title 
Freehold and customary 
without title    
   Kernel Imben  Kernel  Imben  Kernel  Imben  Kernel Imben 
ATT 0.122  0.027  0  -0.192  0.263  0.009  0.132***  0.096**   
S.E. -0.102  -0.057  -0.235  -0.124 -0.283  -0.158  -0.058  -0.042 
N 2733 2733  202  202 87  87  2896 2896 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Notes:  * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; S.E. = Standard Error 
Regarding access to formal credit, none of the ATTs was statistically significant for any of the 
comparisons (see Table 11). The lack of statistical significance of all the comparisons may be connected 
to the limited availability of formal credit, as informal credit remains the dominant form. For example, 
one question in the survey asked why rural households had not borrowed from a formal credit source, and 
the top responses were inadequate security and a lack of local supply of credit.
19 These issues of credit 
supply are outside the focus of this paper but warrant further investigation.  
                                                      
19 The top reason for not applying for credit with a formal institution was inadequate security (freehold 30 percent, and 
customary 24 percent). The top reason of those without title for not applying for a loan with a formal institution was also 
inadequate security. Alternatively, those with title sighted lack of need or high interest rates as their top reasons for not applying 
for formal loans.   
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Table 11 Results for access to formal credit 
Access to Formal Credit Sources 
   Customary with and 
without title 
Freehold with and 
without title 
Freehold and customary 
with title 
Freehold and customary 
without title    
   Kernel Imben  Kernel Imben Kernel  Imben Kernel Imben 
ATT  -0.011 0.017 0.048  -0.067 0.263 0.171 0  -0.017 
S.E. -0.072  -0.05  -0.205  -0.109 -0.218 -0.145  -0.049 -0.035 
N  2733 2733  202  202  87  87  2896 2896 
Source: Compiled by authors 




8.  CONCLUSION 
In Uganda the importance of access to rural credit is recognized throughout the country, and so is the 
impact of land tenure and title on access to that credit. In Uganda’s Plan for Modernization of Agriculture 
(2005), lack of access to credit is identified as a major impediment to rural farmers acquiring non-labor 
inputs and surviving during agricultural downturns. The plan also notes the potential of the land tenure 
reforms to positively impact the modernization of agriculture, but stresses the unreached potential of the 
situation. The importance of access to credit is not limited to Uganda but is a continent-wide problem. 
The African Development Bank (2002) has identified the lack of access to credit in rural Africa as a 
significant hindrance to the agricultural and social development of the region. The continued emphasis on 
promoting freehold tenure and titling, with the corresponding positive effects on credit access, has pushed 
many African countries, including Uganda, to adopt land titling systems. This paper took on these 
hypotheses and assessed the impact of different titles/certificates and land tenures on credit access.  
The only statistically significant difference in access to any credit and to informal credit was found 
between freehold and customary without title, which happened to be the largest group. The impact, 
however, was not present in formal credit, contrary to the original hypothesis that freehold would impact 
access to formal credit, with only some effect on informal credit. The reason for the limited impact of 
tenure and title on formal credit may be the limited supply of formal credit; with such limited availability 
of formal credit, other factors inhibiting credit availability (such as access to markets) may be more 
binding than land tenure or title. A possible explanation for the significant impact of freehold tenure on 
informal credit access, despite the lack of lenders’ ability to use land as formal recoverable collateral, is 
the use of tenure status as a screening device rather than as collateral by informal lenders. This hypothesis 
requires further research that is beyond the scope of this paper.  
As mentioned before, the existing literature has been mixed in its findings regarding the impact of 
tenure on access to credit. This may be a result of less intensive scrutiny, as the approach presented here 
allows for a multidimensional view of the impact of tenure and title on credit access. Beyond the results 
of this paper, the comparisons used provide an innovative approach that is applicable to evaluating tenure 
and title in other areas of interest. Possibilities may include analysis of the four comparison groups by 
land management techniques, agricultural output, gender restrictions on landownership, and many other 
issues related to land. By using a two-stage comparison, first within tenure status between title/no title, 
and then within title/no title between tenure status, researchers can obtain a more complete understanding 
of which aspect—tenure or title—is actually impacting the results.  
Overall, the impacts of tenure and titling did not differ between general access and informal 
access, probably due to the pervasiveness of informal credit. Formal credit lacked significant results, due 
to the limited access to formal credit for all rural households. And as noted before, tenure status, not title, 
proved the difference in access to credit. Though not the end goal of the Land Act, which was the 
transition to a completely titled, freehold country, there is reason for hope. The positive impact of 
freehold over customary tenure on credit access may provide the incentive for customary households to 
transition to freehold, which is the purpose of the Land Act of 1998. Therefore, the government of 
Uganda should work to promote the increased opportunities for those with freehold, while fostering a 
desire for titling. This goal is possible if the Ugandan government first increases awareness of the Land 
Act, which is critical to further progress toward a free land market.
20 A case study of Uganda’s land laws 
cited that dissemination of information is severely limited, but that increased knowledge of the Land Act 
has the potential for large economic benefits (Deininger et al. 2006). Once information is provided to 
Ugandans about their rights and responsibilities as landowners, the path to tenure and titling must be 
simplified and mainstreamed. Currently the path from customary to freehold includes monetary costs, 
temporal costs, and documentation, which implies a degree of literacy of the applicant; these constraints 
                                                      
20 When asked if they knew about the changes in the land tenure system brought about by the Land Act of 1998, of the entire 
sample, only 16 percent of household heads and 10 percent of spouses responded yes.  
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create a difficult and sometimes insurmountable situation for rural Ugandans (Mwebaza 1999). 
Combining these two strategies may allow more Ugandans, and Africans, to experience a positive impact 
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